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I. INTRODUCTION
In Geduldig v. Aielo,1 the United States Supreme Court held
that California's refusal to insure normal pregnancies in the state
disability insurance program was not a violation of the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Over strong dissent,2
the Court held that California could take one step at a time in se-
lecting the disabilities its insurance program would cover. There-
fore, the statutory scheme did not involve a denial of equal protec-
tion and the district court was reversed. In this holding, the Court
offered dicta3 which have sewn the seeds of confusion in the lower
courts and left murkier than ever the question of the constitutional-
ity of sex-based classifications.
II. THE FACTS
In the original action brought before a three judge district
court,4 four women challenged section 2626 of the California Unem-
ployment Compensation Disability Fund Act5 which refused pay-
1. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
2. The dissent, written by Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas
and Marshall, is discussed in note 20 and accompanying text infra.
3. 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20.
4. Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
5. CAL. UNEmPL. INs. CoDE §§ 2601 et seq. (West 1972). The fund, estab-
lished in 1946, is a comprehensive legislative scheme designed to pro-
vide protection against wage loss caused by involuntary unemploy-
ment. The program is completely supported by employee contribu-
tions. Presently employees must contribute one percent of their sal-
ary up to a maximum of $85 per year.
To be eligible for the program, an employee must have contributed,
prior to the time of his disability, one percent of a minimum income
of $300 during a one year base period. If the employee satisfies this
requirement, he is eligible for basic weekly benefits beginning on the
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ment of benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities. Section 2626
provides:
'Disability" or "disabled" includes both mental and physical injury.
An individual shall be deemed to be disabled in any day in which,
because of his physical or mental condition, he is unable to perform
his regular or customary work. In no case shall the term "dis-
ability" or "disabled" include any injury or illness caused by or
arising in connection with pregnancy up to the termination of such
pregnancy and for a period of 28 days thereafter.6
Three of the women suffered unemployment disabilities attrib-
utable to abnormal pregnancies. 7 The fourth, Jacqueline Jaramillo,
claimed that a normal pregnancy caused her disability. The dis-
trict court held that the statute's "exclusion of pregnancy-related
disabilities was not based on a classification having a rational and
substantial relationship to a legitimate state purpose,"8 and, there-
fore, violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
Ten days before the district court's decision in Geduldig, the
California Court of Appeals decided a case brought for disability
benefits for an ectopic pregnancy, 9 Rentzer v. Unemployment In-
surance Appeals Board.10 The state court had held that section
2626 did not bar payment of benefits for disabilities arising from
medical complications during pregnancy, but precluded only the
payment of benefits for disabilities accompanying normal preg-
nancy. The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board acquiesced
in this construction of section 2626 and issued administrative guide-
lines excluding only the payment of hospitalization and disability
benefits for normal delivery and recuperation.11
There was apparently no opportunity to call the district court's
attention to Rentzer, and the court later denied a motion for recon-
eighth day of disability or the first day of hospitalization. Claims are
required to be accompanied by affidavits of a licensed physician and
the employee must submit to reasonable examinations required by the
State Department of Human Resources Development.
The program provides benefits for almost any incapacity including
cosmetic surgery. In addition to the pregnancy exclusion, the program
also does not cover one confined in an institution as a dipsomaniac,
drug addict, or sexual psychopath.
6. Id. § 2626 (emphasis added).
7. 417 U.S. at 489. The three women were Carolyn Aiello (ectopic preg-
nancy); Augustine Armendariz (miscarriage); and Elizabeth Johnson
(tubal pregnancy).
8. 359 F. Supp. at 801.
9. An ectopic pregnancy is caused by gestation outside the uterus, often
in a Fallopian tube.
10. 32 Cal. App. 3d 604, 108 Cal. Rptr. 336 (Ct. App. 1973).
11. 417 U.S. at 491.
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sideration. 12 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Rentzer
had mooted the issue as to the three women with abnormal preg-
nancies and that only Jaramillo had a live controversy concerning
the validity of section 2626. The Court reversed the district court
and found no denial of equal protection as to Jaramillo.
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
The district court viewed the questions to be decided in terms
of traditional equal protection analyses. It first determined what
classification was involved, and then applied the appropriate stand-
ard of review. The court determined that because only women
suffer pregnancy-related disabilities, the classification was one
based on sex. It then proceeded to apply the intermediate "fair and
substantial relationship" test for equal protection scrutiny of legis-
lative classifications. 13 The court concluded that the state could
not demonstrate that the classification had a "fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation."'14
The Supreme Court viewed the issue differently. Instead of fo-
cusing on the classification and the standard of review to be applied,
the Court analyzed the equal protection issue in terms of the
underinclusiveness of the set of risks the state had selected to in-
sure. It then reiterated the position that the state could take one
step at a time in selecting the disabilities it wished to cover and
held that California need not include pregnancy disabilities simply
because it chose to insure other risks.
Utiizing the reasoning behind Dandridge v. Williams,15 the
12. Id.
13. Traditionally, the Court has adopted a two-pronged test for equal pro-
tection. If the statute concerns a suspect class (e.g., race, aliens, or
nationality) or if it concerns a fundamental right (e.g., right to vote,
travel, or procreate), the Court will apply a standard of strict judicial
scrutiny and the state must show a compelling state interest in the
classification. This is an extremely difficult standard to meet and has
only been met in rare instances.
If there is no suspect class or fundamental right involved, the Court
has traditionally presumed that the classification is valid. If any pos-
sible reason can be imagined for the state's classification, it will be up-
held under a rational basis test.
Recently, however, the Court has introduced an intermediate test.
This test removes the presumption of validity and requires that the
classification have a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation. This new test, hereinafter called the fair and substantial
relationship test, is set out in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and
is discussed in detail in Developments in the Law: Equal Protection,
82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
14. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
15. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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Geduldig Court once again rejected the idea that a state must
choose between attacking every aspect of a problem and not attack-
ing the problem at all. Therefore, under the least stringent rational
basis test, any legitimate state interest would satisfy the constitu-
tional requirements of equal protection. It found such interest in
the state's desire to maintain the self-supporting nature of the in-
surance program, 6 and in a strong state commitment to keeping
the contribution rate at its present level. Because the additional
benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities would increase the cost
of the program,1' the Court held that the state had met the burden
of showing a legitimate state interest. Thus, with this holding, the
-Court simply reiterated the rule established in Dandridge v.
Williams,18 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,' 9 and Jefferson v. Hack-
ney20 that the asserted underinclusiveness of a state administered
social program may be balanced against a legitimate state interest to
negate an allegation of unconstitutionality under the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The dissenting opinion in Geduldig, on the other hand, followed
the reasoning of the district court. Justice Brennan, in dissent,
agreed that the classification was one based on sex.
In my view, by singling out for less favorable treatment a gender-
linked disability peculiar to women, the State has created a double
standard for disability compensation: a limitation is imposed upon
the disabilities for which women workers may recover, while men
receive full compensation for all disabilities suffered, including
those that affect only or primarily their sex, such as prostatect-
omies, circumcision, hemophilia, and gout. In effect, one set of
rules is applied to females and another to males. Such dissimilar
treatment of men and women, on the basis of physical character-
istics inextricably linked to one sex, inevitably constitutes sex dis-
crimination. 21
Thus having decided the threshold question that the classifica-
16. See note 5 supra.
17. There was considerable discussion about how much more it would cost
to include pregnancy-related disabilities. The state argued that it
would cost between $120.2 million and $131 million annually, an in-
crease of 33 to 36 percent. California stated that this increase would
have to come from either an increased contribution rate or a flat dollar
amount, either of which would impose a greater burden on those with
the lowest incomes.
The appellee argued that the added cost would only be $48.9 mil-
lion annually or a 12 percent increase. She said that the increase
could be absorbed in a less drastic manner by changing the maximum
benefits allowed or increasing the maximum contribution rate to $119.
18. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
19. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
20. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
21. 417 U.S. at 501.
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tion was one of disabilities suffered only by women as opposed to
disabilities suffered only by men, the dissent would have held that
the true issue was the proper standard of review to be applied to
classifications based on sex. Using the strict judicial scrutiny test
because there was a suspect class based on sex, Justice Brennan ar-
gued that the state had not demonstrated a compelling state
interest in the classification and that section 2626 was unconstitu-
tional as a denial of equal protection.
Had the dissenting opinion been adopted, it would have clarified
the obscure area of what constitutional standard to apply to sex-
based classifications. In 1971, the Court applied the intermediate
"fair and substantial relationship" test to a sex-based classification
in Reed v. Reed.22 Two years later, four Justices made the pro-
gression and held that sex was a suspect class and the strict judicial
scrutiny test should be applied.23  The next logical step was the
acceptance of sex as a suspect class by a full five-man majority
of the Court.
However, since 1973, the Court has repeatedly failed to take ad-
vantage of the opportunity to finalize this area of the law.24  In
each case, the Court has chosen to sidestep the issue. Geduldig
is one more example of the Supreme Court's reluctance to estab-
lish a standard for equal protection analysis of sex-based classifica-
tions.
IV. FOOTNOTE 20
In Geduldig, the majority addressed the dissent's objections in
footnote 20. In what appeared to be almost an afterthought, the
Court dealt with the classification and the applicable standard of
review.
The dissenting opinion to the contrary, this case is thus a far cry
from cases like Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), involving discrimination based
on gender as such. The California insurance program does not
exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but
merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list
of compensable disabilities. While it is true that only women can
become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classifi-
cation concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those
considered in Reed .... and Frontiero .... Normal pregnancy
is an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique char-
acteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy
22. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
23. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality holding).
24. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975),
and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination
against members of one sex or other, lawmakers are constitutionally
free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legisla-
tion such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to
any other physical condition.
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender
as such under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most
cursory analysis. The program divides potential recipients into
two groups-pregnant women and non-pregnant persons. While
the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members
of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program
thus accrue to members of both sexes. 25
This footnote presents several statements deserving of closer exami-
nation: the classification involved is one of pregnant women versus
non-pregnant persons; distinctions involving pregnancy are consti-
tutionally sound unless they are "mere pretexts designed to effect
invidious discrimination;" and pregnancy-related classifications are
not classifications based on sex.
A. The Classification
At the core of any equal protection analysis is the classification
the Court chooses to examine. Much of the outcome of any given
case depends upon the parameters of the distinctions reviewed. De-
termining the classification depends on individual conceptions of
a legislative scheme and its goals, and wide discretion is given to
the Court in making its selection.
However, the Court strained the concept behind classifications
in Geduldig when it separated the groups into pregnant women and
non-pregnant persons. In so doing, it was clearly attempting to
establish a classification whereby women were in both the groups
receiving and not receiving insurance benefits; therefore, the con-
clusion would be that pregnancy is not a sex-based class. This
grouping overlooks the fact that the distinction drawn by the Cali-
fornia legislature was not based on types of persons but rather on
types of disabilities to be covered. California did not exclude preg-
nant women from all coverage while extending benefits to non-
pregnant persons. What it did was exclude the disability of preg-
nancy while including almost every other disability. 26 In attempt-
ing to obviate the necessity for looking at sex-based classifications,
the Court failed to examine the classifications as established by
the California legislature.
Ironically, the Court could have avoided the question of sex-
25. 417 U.S. at 496-97.
26. See note 5 supra.
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based classifications and the confusion resulting from footnote 20
by adopting the limitations imposed by Rentzer 27 and subjecting
them to present equal protection analysis. This would not have
solved the Court's dilemma concerning sex-based distinctions, but
it'would have permitted the majority to deal with the classifica-
tion presented. After the Rentzer court's determination that abnor-
mal pregnancies were covered under section 2626, the classification
left for Supreme Court review was one of disabilities suffered by
women with abnormal pregnancies versus disabilities suffered by
women with normal pregnancies.
That classification turns on types of disabilities, not on sex, and
the less stringent "fair and substantial relationship" test would ap-
ply. Under that test any legitimate state interest, such as Califor-
nia's desire to provide a continuing and inexpensive, self-supporting
program, would uphold the classification.
Using such an analysis would not have solved the ever-remain-
ing problem of what standard of review should be applied to sex-
based classifications. However, it would have permitted the Court
to continue to reflect upon this issue and it would have obviated
the need for the confusing dicta in footnote 20.
B. Pretexts Designed to Effect Invidious Discrimination
The Court severely limited the application of the fourteenth
amendment in sex discrimination cases by declaring that distinc-
tions involving pregnancy are constitutionally acceptable unless
they are mere pretexts designed to effect discrimination. It is diffi-
cult to imagine many instances in which the distinction involved
would merely be a pretext for discrimination, except for the
extreme case in which pregnancy is an excuse to fire a woman em-
ployee. Apparently, a state or an employer 28 can make distinc-
tions based on pregnancy in restricting types of work, hours, or
benefits to be received so long as there is no intention to discrimi-
nate invidiously against women.
Where a classification excludes pregnant women in an attempt
to discriminate maliciously and intentionally against women, the
protection of the fourteenth amendment will be invoked. Few such
situations can be imagined.
C. Pregnancy-based Classifications as Sex-based Classifications
Footnote 20 stated that pregnancy-based classifications are not
sex-based classifications. This was necessary to justify the Court's
27. See notes 10-11 and accompanying text supra.
28. See Section IV discussing sex-based classifications under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
140 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 55, NO. 1 (1975)
failure to determine what standard of review to apply to sex-based
classifications.
Certain criteria have been established by the Court to determine
when a suspect class exists. The class is suspect if it bears no rela-
tion to ability; if the persons within it are locked in (if it is an
immutable trait); and if a stigma of inferiority is attached to it. 29
As the four Justices in Frontiero agreed, sex falls within these re-
quirements.30 Sex has nothing to do with ability; a person is
locked into the sex she is born with; and a clear stigma of inferiority
historically has been attached to the female sex. Furthermore,
to hold that pregnancy-based distinctions are not sex-based dis-
tinctions is to ignore one aspect of what makes sex an immutable
trait: only women are capable of bearing children. A woman is
not locked into pregnancy. There are ways to avoid it. However,
biology locks only women into the possibility of becoming pregnant.
Furthermore, a woman will be locked into a class which will be
discriminated against if she decides to become pregnant.
Just as sex-based classifications largely depend on outdated
historical attitudes, so too does discrimination against pregnant
women. It has been believed that women would quit working after
becoming pregnant--or at least that they should. It was thought
that pregnant women ought to be kept home and out of sight. It
was felt that pregnancy was something women let happen to them
(alone) 81 and it could have been prevented if they were respon-
29. Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, note 13, supra at 1173-
74.
30. The four Justices, Brennan, Douglas, White and Marshall, determined
that sex was a suspect class under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. The United States Air Force argued that administrative
convenience required the ruling that spouses of uniformed males were
dependents for the purpose of benefits, but that spouses of uniformed
females were not dependents unless they were in fact dependent for
over one-half of their support. The Court held that administrative
convenience did not pass constitutional muster under the strict judicial
scrutiny test.
31. The court in Turner v. Department of Employment Sec., - Utah
531 P.2d 870 (1975), provides an excellent example of the historical
societal attitudes:
The question she poses is this: Is the statute set out above
void in that it denies to her rights which are given to males?
We do not think so. Should a man be unable to work
because he was pregnant, the statute would apply to him
equally as it does to her. What she should do is to work for
the repeal of the biological law of nature. She should get it
amended so that men share equally with women in bearing
children. If she could prevail upon the Great Creator to so
order things, she would be guilty of violating the equal pro-
tection of the law unless she saw to it that man could also
share in the thrill and glory of Motherhood.
It is just as bad to treat unequal things as equals as it is
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sible members of the work force. And there was reluctance to ac-
cept the fact that women, with their unique biological functions,
were a major force in the working community.
These kinds of societal attitudes are similar to the misconceptions
that forced the Court in Frontiero to declare that sex was a sus-
pect class. They are the underlying presumptions ingrained in
legislative declarations and private opinion which led that Court
to determine that sex-based classifications should receive strict
scrutiny to determine if there was a compelling state interest for
such a distinction. Those same presumptions mandate that preg-
nancy-based classifications receive similar treatment. Therefore, it
is unfortunate that a classification which is so clearly sex-based was
allowed to remain and that the Court has again avoided deciding
what is the appropriate standard of review to be applied to sex-
based classifications.
V. SEX-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS UNDER TITLE VII
Although the dicta in Geduldig suggest that pregnancy-based
classifications are not sex-based classifications, lower courts have
ignored this in cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.32 Lower courts heretofore faced with pregnancy-related
classifications under Title VII have held that Geduldig has no ap-
plication since it arose under the fourteenth amendment.
In each case, federal courts of appeal have determined that the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") guidelines
preclude any discrimination against pregnant women. The guide-
lines state:
Employment policies relating to pregnancy and childbirth.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscar-
riage, abortion, childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all
job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated
as such under any health or temporary disability insurance or
sick leave plan available in connection with employment. Written
and unwritten employment policies and practices involving matters
such as the commencement and duration of leave, the availability
of extensions, the accrual of seniority and other benefits and privi-
leges, reinstatement, and payment under any health or temporary
disability insurance or sick leave plan, formal or informal, shall
be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same
terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary dis-
abilities.
to treat equal things unequally. In the matter of pregnancy
there is no way to find equality between men and women.
The Great Creator so ordained the difference and there are
few women who would wish to change the situation.
Id. at _, 531 P.2d at 871.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2 (a) (1) (1970).
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(c) Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily
disabled is caused by an employment policy under which insuffi-
cient or no leave is available, such a termination violates the Act
if it has a disparate impact on employees of one sex and is not
justified by business necessity. 3
Thus, in Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. AT&T
Longlines Department,3 4 Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Casualty In-
surance Co.,35 and Gilbert v. General Electric Co.,26 the Second,
Third and Fourth Circuits, respectively, have held that disability
plans offering fewer benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities than
for other temporary disabilities violate Title VII.
The courts distinguished Geduldig because it arose under the
fourteenth amendment and avoided considering the implications of
Geduldig by reasoning that the Supreme Court would not have
intended its holding to apply to Title VII cases without stating this
explicitly. The Communications Workers court said:
If ... [Geduldig] was a definitive holding that, absent mere pre-
text, disparity of treatment of pregnancy-related disabilities could
not constitute a violation of Title VII, [Geduldig] would substan-
tially circumscribe the reach of that Act of Congress and would
invalidate the guidelines as to treatment of pregnancy disabilities
issued by the EEOC. It is inconceivable that the majority opinion
intended so to hold without even a mention of Title VII or the
guidelines. 37
The apparent lesson to be learned from the lower courts'
interpretation of Geduldig is that cases involving pregnancy-based
distinctions ought to be brought under Title VII. 38 The validity
of this proposition will soon come under judicial review, however,
with the granting of certiorari by the Supreme Court in the case
of Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Casualty Insurance Co.39
VI. CONCLUSION
By refusing to make a determination on pregnancy-based dis-
33. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1973). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(b) (1973),
which prohibits discrimination with regard to fringe benefits.
34. 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975).
35. 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975).
36. 44 U.S.L.W. 2013 (U.S. June 27, 1975).
37. 513 F.2d at 1030.
38. The Nebraska Supreme Court recently failed to follow this procedure
in Richards v. Omaha Pub. Schools, 194 Neb. 463, 232 N.W.2d 29 (1975),
a case involving mandatory maternity leave. The court was familiar
with the Wetzel decision and aware of the trend holding cases arising
under Title VII to a different standard. However, the court held that
Geduldig's declaration that pregnancy-based classifications are not
sex-based classifications mandated a decision upholding the leave
policy.
39. 43 U.S.L.W. 3587 (U.S. April 29, 1975).
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tinctions, the Supreme Court has avoided deciding what standard
of review to apply to sex-based classifications. This has led to in-
equitable results and the Court is now caught in a mire of contra-
dictions. A pregnant woman whose employer is regulated by EEOC
guidelines may successfully challenge benefits extended under dis-
ability plans which are not made available to pregnant women.
Similarly situated pregnant women whose only recourse is under
the fourteenth amendment must accept such discrimination because
of the Court's ruling in Geduldig. This contradiction will have to
be handled when the Court reviews the Wetzel decision.
Even more basic is the dichotomy the Court has created by
establishing a fundamental right of procreation, while sanctioning
discrimination under the fourteenth amendment should a woman
decide to exercise that right. Although adhering to the theory
that only legislation serving a compelling governmental in-
terest should be allowed to interfere with the right of procreation,
the Court has tolerated pregnancy-based classifications having a
mere rational relationship to the object of the legislation. The
Court cannot continue to condone pregnancy-based classifications
while defending the fundamental right of procreation. The Court
should no longer avoid the issues by retreating to an obscure foot-
note. It is time to deal with them directly.
Rebecca L. Ross '76
40. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
